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A Background Document

Civil Society and Climate Justice Overview

Sida Civil Society Center
Härnösand, Sweden, August 25–27, 2008

Civil Society and Climate Justice Overview

A Background Document for the Conference "Civil Society on Climate Change & Justice"

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List of abbreviations

CO2	carbon dioxide
CCD	Commission on Climate Change and Development
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CER	Certified Emissions Reduction
COP	Conference of the Parties (to UNFCCC)
CSD	the UN Commission on Sustainable Development
CSO	civil society organisation
ETS	European Trading Scheme
EU	the European Union
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
GDR	greenhouse development rights
IPCC	Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
IPR	intellectual property rights
JI	Joint Implementation
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCF	Prototype Carbon Fund
ppm	parts per million
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992)
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States dollars
WCD	World Commission on Dams
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002)
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1. Introduction

This paper has been drafted as a background document to the conference "Civil Society on Climate Change & Justice" at the Sida Civil Society Center in Härnösand, Sweden, on August 25–27, 2008.

The main target group for the conference is Swedish civil society organisations, CSOs, that are engaged in development cooperation programs, and their developing country partners. While some of these organisations have already been doing considerable work on climate change and related issues, others are only now starting to reflect on how climate change will affect development.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of a range of issues, initiatives and fora where Swedish and Southern CSOs are engaged. But although the paper is already lengthy, it is inevitably incomplete. Priority has been given to providing examples of how climate change is linked to development; showcasing how CSOs are engaging and can engage, from a wide range of different entry points, in activities that are relevant to climate change; and mapping of some key institutions and processes that may provide opportunities for CSOs to influence climate change and development policy linkages.

The paper does not address – except where there are clear development dimensions to the issues – the considerable work that many Swedish CSOs are engaged in with the aim to influence internal Swedish or EU policies on climate change, or to reduce the climate impact of the consumption patterns and lifestyles of people in Sweden.

Although a brief introduction is provided on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC (see the chapter on Climate Change Policy Fora), and on recent scientific findings with regard to climate change and its effects on human welfare and the environment, readers are referred to other sources for more detailed information on these issues. The "Feeling the Heat" section on the UNFCCC web site provides a short introduction to the basic science, evidence and effects of climate change.[1]

[1] http://unfccc.int/essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2917.php

2. Issues and CSO Responses

2.1 Climate Justice, what does it mean?

Although the Earth's atmosphere is shared by all living organisms, it is only in the past few decades that a realisation has been growing that the atmosphere is in fact a limited common property resource. In order for this resource to be properly maintained and shared, an efficient and equitable global management system is required.

Carbon dioxide (CO2) circulates in the biosphere in complicated and changing patterns. Over a time span of a few human generations, changes in the amounts of carbon that is stored in the biosphere (in trees and other organisms, and in the soil) can affect, to a significant degree, the net concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

However, sometimes carbon is trapped in geological oil and gas deposits or in stable chemical form on the deep ocean floor. The sum of these processes creates a space for a limited release carbon from these stores without increasing the total amount of carbon in the biosphere.

Since the beginning of industrialisation, CO2 levels in the atmosphere have increased from 280 to more than 380 parts per million (ppm). There is a growing consensus that in order to avoid dangerous climate change, with an increase of the average global temperature below 2 degrees C, atmospheric CO2 levels need to be stabilised at between 400 and 450 ppm, or lower.[2] Given the projected human population by the middle of this century, this would allow for an average emission of about 1 ton of CO2 per capita. The IPCC estimates that global emissions need to be reduced by 50–85

[2] In its recent report to the Swedish Government, the Scientific Council on Climate Issues notes in the that there is broad agreement that the temperatures may rise by more than two degrees if the greenhouse gas levels reach 450 ppm carbon dioxide equivalents. If the concentration stabilises at 450 ppm CO2e, "there is a significant risk that the 2 degree target cannot be met". *Vetenskapligt underlag för klimatpolitiken. Rapport från Vetenskapliga rådet för klimatfrågor.* Miljövårdsberedningens rapport 2007:03.

percent by 2050. [3] Several large Swedish CSOs suggests that Swedish emissions need to be cut by 90 percent by the same year, and by 40 percent before 2020.[4]

Over the same time period the levels of other potent greenhouse gases have also substantially increased: methane concentrations have doubled and nitrous oxide levels have risen by about 15 percent.

The global emissions of greenhouse gases have always been very unevenly distributed. The historical responsibility for the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions over the past 250 years lies with the industrialized countries of the North, and cheap energy – in the form of oil, coal and gas – has been the engine of their rapid industrialization and economic growth.

And the inequalities continue. Today, average global CO2 emission levels are about four tons per capita – which is approximately equivalent to the current rate of emissions in China. The United States, Australia and a few other industrialised countries emit 20 tons or more per capita. At the same time, in spite of recent growth in and rising incomes for hundreds of millions of its citizens, the per capita emissions in India are only around one ton, and in many developing countries it is much lower than that. If emissions of other greenhouse gases are factored in, emissions from some developing countries with high rates of deforestation and land conversion are considerably higher.

But it is not only the emissions that have been, and still are, unevenly distributed. The capacity of countries to respond to the challenges of climate change – both to adapt to the changes that will inevitably come, and to invest in sustainable energy, transportation, agriculture and manufacturing systems – differ greatly. Global investment needs in the energy sector alone has been estimated at some $16,000 billion by 2030.[5]

From the perspective of climate justice, the main responsibility for reducing emissions and financing systemic transformation must be taken by those who have benefited most from the past 250 years of economic development. Furthermore, any solutions to climate change must protect the most vulnerable, compensate those who are displaced, guarantee individual and collective rights, and respect peoples right to participate in decisions that impact on their lives.

Applying the "global commons" perspective on the atmosphere also has implications for some of the measures that are taken in response to climate change. As industrial countries, corporations and affluent segments of the poorer country populations emit more greenhouse gases than the ecosystems can absorb, they encroach on more than their share of the global common that the atmosphere

[3] *Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report* Available at www.ipcc.ch

[4] See http://www.svenskakyrkan.se/default.aspx?di=86585&ptdi=0 and www.snf.se

[5] *Taking Stock of Progress in the Clean Development Mechanism.* Jane Ellis, Jan Corfee-Morlot and Harald Winkler. OECD 2004.

constitutes. Carbon trading schemes put an economic value to the use of this common property resource. But in the case of the European trading scheme, the European Union is unilaterally giving out to member country industries – and so far without charge – rights to emissions that are in excess of the EUs rightful share of this global common. Groups may have different views on the political and philosophical appropriateness of such "privatisation of the atmosphere" in itself. However, many CSOs argue that in a more equitable scheme, the incomes from the sale of emissions rights would at least be made available to the global rights holders who do not get or use their equitable share of the resource.

2.1 How Climate Change Affects the Poor

The consequences of climate change will be felt all over the world, but the impacts will be very different. To some extent, such differences depend geographic and environmental variables: for example, areas with low precipitation will tend to be more vulnerable to changes in rainfall patterns. But vulnerability to climate change also depends largely on economic and social conditions. This means that developing countries will be disproportionally affected. But within all societies, some sections of the population will be more vulnerable than others. The poor will generally be included among these vulnerable groups. Not only do they have limited access to money, land, protection and power, they also depend more directly on their immediate environment and natural resources. As a result, they are more both more exposed to climate shocks, and less capable to adapt. Women, indigenous peoples and socially or economically excluded minorities, who represent disproportionate shares among the poor, will also be particularly vulnerable, as will children.

But it is not only the impacts of climate change itself that poses threats to the livelihoods, right and lives of the poor. In many ways, the human activities that contribute to climate change, as well as some of the measures that are taken to respond to climate change, also have negative impacts on the poor.

But responses to climate change may also offer new opportunities: Investments in renewable energy sources have the potential, if done properly, to provide better access to energy for people who are today not connected to the power grids, or have to rely on expensive and unsustainable solutions. In some specific contexts, small farmers are also finding new income opportunities in the production energy crops. New funds for adaptation can give the added benefits of contributing to reducing poverty and strengthening the rights of poor people.

This section looks at how some of the causes, impacts and policies affect the poor, and gives some examples of how civil society organisations respond to these changes. It must be noted that the

list of responses and – in particular – the examples of CSOs that work on them, are only illustrative and do not claim to present a full or balanced picture.[6]

Causes of climate change

Oil, gas and coal

The main source of human induced greenhouse gas emissions are fossil fuels: oil, coal, fossil gas and peat.[7] To a great extent, the extraction of these fuels happens in developing countries. Although the debate in Sweden tends to focus on the environmental effects of the burning of these fuels – CO2 emissions, urban air pollution – the extraction, processing and transportation of the fuels is associated with several greatly detrimental impacts in developing countries: the oil extraction, pipelines and shipping are sources of severe water, land and air pollution problems; expansion of the oil industry disrupts the lives and livelihoods of indigenous communities and opens up forest areas for deforestation; coal mining can disrupt ground water levels and pollute water sources to the detriment of local communities, and is responsible for many thousands of workers' deaths annually due to accidents and occupational health hazards, etc.

CSO responses:

On all continents, communities that are faced with these and other impacts have been mobilising to protect their rights and their livelihoods. In an increasing number of cases, groups are also linking their actions to climate change (already in 1997, Ibo activists in the Niger delta shut down oil pipelines under the slogan "Stop Climate Change!"). With a few exceptions – such as the case of Ken Saro-Wiva and his colleagues, who were brutally murdered by the regime in Nigeria – these protests go unnoticed in the North.

- The OilWatch network, with its secretariat located in Nigeria, is a Southern network of organisations that resist the oil industry.[8] It has members in more than 50 countries, including most major oil producing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (but not the Middle East where, in most cases, the space for CSOs is severely restricted). Members include indigenous peoples, community and youth and organisations, many national Friends of the Earth member organisations (OilWatch was originally a FoE project) and other environmental groups. The network has been supported by the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC), and UBV/Education for Development Cooperation has worked with local OilWatch partners in Latin America.

[6] Suggestions for examples to be included in the final version of this report can be emailed to the author: goran@context.nu

[7] *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policy Makers*, p 5. IPCC 2007. http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm

[8] www.oilwatch.org

- Swedish environmental organisations and several of their partners in the South participated, or engaged in advocacy around, the World Bank initiated Extractive Industries Review, which aimed at minimising the negative impacts of World Bank support to oil and gas extraction and mining. The report of the Review recommended stronger social and environmental standards for projects (including pro-poor sharing of revenues), and the phasing out of World Bank support for fossil fuel projects. Still, in 2006 the Bank's investments in renewable energy project only accounted for 5 percent of its energy portfolio.[9]

Deforestation and forest degradation

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) every year some 13 million hectares of forests are converted to other land uses every year. The highest rates of forest losses occur in Africa and Latin America, while the forest biomass in many industrial countries and in China actually grows.[10]

In addition, losses in forest biomass also result from the degradation of forests, which contributes to the release of carbon dioxide from the standing forest stock. Both deforestation and forest degradation can also result in the release of carbon that is stored in the soil.

The expansion of agriculture is a major cause of deforestation. However, this expansion is often preceded and facilitated by other activities that open up the forests to exploitation: logging, construction of roads and dams, oil extraction and mining, etc.

Significant tracts of forests are also converted into plantation – an important change that is not always correctly reflected in forest statistics. Conversion of natural forests into plantations greatly reduces biodiversity, and often restricts the access by local communities to a sustainable use of forest resources. Forests and plantations are also not equal in terms of the amount of carbon that they store – although there are local variations, a natural forest usually stores significantly more carbon, and conversion to plantations thus in itself causes the release of carbon dioxide and contributes to climate change. Such effects may be greatly magnified in cases where stored soil carbon is released, particularly as a result of drainage.

All these changes have the potential to negatively affect local and forest dependent communities in a multitude or ways, including:

[9] *How the World Bank's Energy Framework Sells the Climate and Poor People Short. A Civil Society Response to the World Bank's Investment Framework for Clean Energy and Development.* SEEN, October 2006. http://www.seen.org/PDFs/Energy_Framework_CSO.pdf

[10] FAO definitions, assessment tools on the state of the world's forest are strongly criticised by many CSOs who mean that the resulting statistics underestimate forest losses by, among other things, failing to assess biodiversity parameters and to distinguish between forests and tree plantations. Figure from *State of the World's Forests 2007*. http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en

- by reducing or eliminating access to forest resources like wild foods (fruits, vegetables, honey, game), fodder, firewood, building materials and medicinal plants – much of which is crucial not least for women's livelihood and income generating capacities
- by increasing water run-off, which may increase the frequency and intensity of floods and landslides in the rainy season, and of droughts in the dry season
- by displacing people from land that is converted to plantations, splitting and dispersing villages and disrupting their cultures and traditions of indigenous peoples.

CSO responses:

- Swedish organisations work with Southern partners to influence the behaviour of companies, financial institutions, aid agencies and forest certification organisations in order to ensure that they do not contribute to deforestation but promote sustainable forest management practices.
- Swedish organisations support environmental groups and organisations and networks of indigenous and forest dependent people in the South in building their capacity to organise and mobilise to defend and assert their rights and their forests.
- Swedish organisations inform retailers and consumers about the effects that imported tropical forest products (furniture, palm oil, tropical hardwood for floors, boats, etc) have for the forest and forest communities.

Agriculture and the food industry

A recent study from the FAO estimates that about 30 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions can be attributed to the agriculture and food sector – mostly, though, through deforestation caused by the expansion of the agricultural frontier (see above). About 12,5 out of the 30 percent comes from other sources that include the use of energy in agriculture and in the production of agricultural inputs, and emissions of methane and nitrous dioxide from livestock, manure and land management practices). In most modern agricultural systems, the energy input greatly exceeds the energy that is contained in the food.

The total contribution of greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture is not necessarily proportional to the amount of food that is produced, but very much depends on factors that include agricultural systems, production technologies and the mix of foods that are produced. As an example, the expansion of soy production, which is a major cause of deforestation, is an effect both of an increasing demand for meat, and of the increasing use of protein rich fodder on which animals are raised in "industrial" meat production systems. An increasing production of meat – beef in particular – also causes increased emissions of methane to the atmosphere.

The use of tractors and other agricultural machines is one obvious reason why agriculture uses much fossil energy. However, the production of chemical fertilisers is very energy intensive, and production processes often rely on the use of fossil gas, oil or coal. Chemical pesticides, herbicides and fungicides are also produced in energy-intensive processes that rely heavily on fossil fuels. This is one reason why organic agriculture, even when mechanised, is considerably more climate friendly.

Carbon dioxide emissions that are caused by the transport of agricultural products from producers to consumers is an issue that is rather widely discussed in Sweden. The discussion, however, tends to focus on air freight of relatively small volumes of food and flowers from developing countries, without relating them to the emissions that are caused by massive volumes of semi-processed and processed food transported on roads within Europe or Sweden, or to the very significant energy required for producing the same products in heated greenhouses. Some European development CSOs caution against a general call to "buy local", as it could harm important developing country exports while making very little difference to global greenhouse gas emissions.

The expansion and intensification of industrialised agriculture have the potential to negatively affect small farmers, agricultural workers and local communities in a multitude of ways, including trough:

- an increasing use of agrochemicals that affect farm workers' health and pollute community water sources.
- displacement of people for the construction of large dams for irrigation, and reduced access to water by farmers who rely on the water source but are not served by the irrigation systems
- increasing dependence on suppliers of agricultural inputs, and on food markets over which they have little or no control
- increased vulnerability to plant pests, disease and drought as agricultural biodiversity is eroded in favour of a few commercial seed varieties and animal breeds
- displacement of small-holders and increasing scarcity of land that is available for distribution through land reform programs
- the effects of conversion of forest land to agricultural uses (See "Deforestation and forest degradation" above).

CSO responses:

- Many Swedish organisations work with Southern partners in promoting sustainable and organic agriculture, which for several reasons is more climate friendly (no use of chemical fertilisers which require large quantities of energy to produce, greater reliance on local resources, sometimes less disruptive soil management methods that maintains or increases soil organic content)

- MJV/FoE-Sweden supports Brazilian CSOs in a project that aims to reduce the impacts of beef production.
- Several Swedish CSOs are active in the organic and fair trade labelling organisations (Rättevisemärkt and KRAV) that have started exploring ways of integrating climate criteria in their labelling systems.

Impacts of climate change

During the last years, the scientific evidence for climate change and its potential impacts on the poor has become increasingly detailed, reliable and disturbing.

In its 2006 report, *The Economics of Climate Change*, the Stern Review estimated that as an effect of climate change "in South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa up to 145–220 million additional people could fall below the US$2 a day poverty line." [11]

The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was presented, in its full and final form, in November 2007.[12] The report translates projected changes into expected effects on water, ecosystems, food, coastal areas and human health and it sets out projected impacts on different world regions:

- In Africa, climate change is projected to expose between 75 and 250 million to increased water stress, reduce yields from rain-fed agriculture by up to 50 percent, and by the end of the 21st century affect low-lying coastal communities;
- In Asia, freshwater availability is projected to decrease, coastal areas will be at greater risk due to increased flooding, and climate change is projected to compound pressures on natural resources and public health;
- In Latin America, climate change threatens significant loss of biodiversity through species extinction. The productivity of some important crops is projected to decline with risks to food security and increases in the number of people at risk of hunger. Water available for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation is likely to be significantly affected;
- Small Islands are expected to face inundation, storm surges, erosion and other coastal hazards, threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and livelihoods of island communities. The erosion of beaches and coral bleaching is expected to affect local resources, and by mid-century climate change is expected to reduce water resources in many small islands to a point where they may be insufficient to meet demand

[11] *The Economics of Climate Change*. The Stern Review. 2006. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm

[12] *Climate change 2007*: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report Available at www.ipcc.ch

Many of the findings from the IPCC Report are developed further in the United Nations Human Development Report 2007/2008[13], which was released just before the Bali conference of the UN Convention on Climate Change. The report argues that climate change could lock the world's poorest countries and their poorest citizens in a downward spiral, leaving hundreds of million facing malnutrition, water scarcity, ecological threats and loss of livelihoods.

But important investigative and analytical work on how climate change affects development is also undertaken by civil society organisations in the environment and development communities. One prominent example is the series of collaborative research reports titles *Up in Smoke that has been produced by the UK based Working Group on Climate Change and Development*. After a first overview report, detailed studies have been published for Africa (two), Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, all with a wealth of local case studies and examples. [14]

The Working Group is supported by over 20 environment and development CSOs and research organisations, and engages a broad range of developing country CSOs in their work The last report, on Asia and the Pacific, lists more than 20 contribution organisations from the region, in addition to national and regional chapters of international organisations.

Agriculture, water and biodiversity

Climate change will affect rainfall, temperature and water availability for agriculture. According to the FAO, industrialized countries could gain in agricultural production potential due to climate change. However, at lower latitudes, crop yield potential is likely to decline for even small global temperature rises, which would increase the risk of hunger.

Rainfed agriculture in marginal areas in semi-arid and sub-humid regions – areas that a large proportion of the world's rural poor depend on – is mostly at risk. Drought affected areas in sub-Saharan Africa could expand by 60–90 million hectares by 2060. Poor peoples' strategies for coping with climate risks can also reinforce deprivation. Producers in drought prone areas often forego production of crops that could raise income, preferring to grow more drought tolerant crops in order to minimise risk. By 2080, an additional 600 million people worldwide may suffer malnutrition due to climate change.[15]

Changes in climate patterns will also have important implications for water security, and the changes will be superimposed on existing pressures on water systems. Many river basins and other water sources are already being unsustainably 'mined'. According

[13] The complete report, and a summary are available via http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007–2008/

[14] www.upinsmokecoalition.org

[15] *Human Development Report 2007/2008*. UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007–2008

to the FAO, around 1.2 billion people, or almost one-fifth of the world's population, live in areas of physical water scarcity, and 500 million people are approaching this situation.[16] Climate change could add around 1,8 billion to the number of people living in a water-scarce environment.[17]

The 2005 Millennium Ecosystems Assessment found that 60 percent of all ecosystem services were already degraded or being used unsustainably. The resilience of ecosystems will be further undermined by climate change, and the ecosystem services that they provide will be compromised. The poor, who depend most heavily on these services will bear the brunt of the costs.

CSO responses:

Many CSOs, including several Swedish development CSOs and their Southern partners, work on issues that address current and future impacts on climate change on agriculture. These include:

- Adapting agricultural practices to new climate patterns. This is done through approaches such as increasing the awareness of farmers and agricultural services of the implications of changes in climate patterns, and promoting changes in cropping systems (see also next bullet point). Examples include partnerships with farmers organisations in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and several other countries (Africa Groups, Church of Sweden, Future Earth, SCC, SSNC, Vi Agroforestry, WWF).
- Watershed protection programs; expanding or introducing water harvesting and water conservation systems, water policy advocacy. Examples of partnerships and programs: many SSNC and WWF partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
- Identifying, conserving, breeding and promoting the use of traditional and better adapted varieties of seeds and seedlings. Examples of partnerships and programs: African Biodiversity Network, Community Biodiversity Developemt and Conservation (CBDC) programme, Searice and Masipag in the Philippines (SSNC, Future Earth).

Health and disasters

Climate change will affect human health in a number of interlinked ways. Poor people, whose development potential is already held back by ill-health, are least equipped to respond to the changing threats and will be experiencing the most important setbacks.

Predicted increases in temperature and rainfall in certain regions are likely to increase the incidence of water-borne diseases such as cholera and malaria. Malaria – one of the biggest killers of children

[16] Coping with water scarcity – Challenge of the twenty-first century. FAO, 2007. http://www.unwater.org/wwd07/downloads/documents/escarcity.pdf

[17] Human Development Report 2007/2008. UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007–2008

under the age of five – is already claiming more than 1 million lives annually. More than 90 percent of deaths occur in Africa, where 65 percent of the victims are children under the age of five. Due to climate change, an additional 220–400 million people could be exposed to malaria. Changing disease patterns are also likely to more than double the population that is exposed to dengue fever.[18]

Climate change is also likely to increase the risk and impacts of climate related hazards. IPCC projections indicate that with a temperature increase of 3–4 degrees, the number of people experiencing coastal flooding may increase by 300 million or more by the end of the 21st century. Rising sea levels could impact some 70 million people in Bangladesh alone. The increasing number of people that live in informal settlements in urban areas, including on hillsides vulnerable too flooding and landslides, is likely to further increase the human costs of extreme weather events.[19]

Children are already more vulnerable than other groups to a broad range of likely climate change impacts: infectious diseases, floods and storms, droughts, heat spells etc. In the next decade, up to 175 million children are likely to be affected every year by the kinds of natural disasters brought about by climate change.[20] Women are also facing higher than average risks during and after disasters. Giving greater attention to the impacts of climate change on women and children will not only help address these impacts – it could more generally help to create greater awareness of the social and humanitarian implications, and better consideration of human realities in the development of adaptation programs.

CSO responses:

Disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness programs, alone or in cooperation between authorities, NGOs and community organisations. A few examples:

- PLAN International's Children-centred and Risk Reduction Program,[21] ActionAid's Disaster Risk Reduction through Schools[22] (both in collaboration with the Institute for Development Studies, IDS)
- Save the Children Alliance work on "children and climate change in the face of disaster"[23]

[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Save the Children Sweden estimate, based on data from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies World Disasters Report 2006. The estimate assumes that current trends will hold, resulting in increases in natural disasters.
[21] http://www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectId=1A17F9E0-BAC8-5EF5-9E00BAAEBF4F35FE
[22] http://www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectId=1A18D8D6-EAB8-3DDE-EEEC7E5BB9B64A1E
[23] In the Face of Disaster: Children and Climate Change. Save the Children, 2008. http://www.savethechildren.net/alliance/media/newsdesk/2008-06-30.html

- Diakonia supported flood prevention and preparedness program in Bangladesh.[24]

Conflicts, instability and migration

The impacts of climate change are likely to aggravate the risks for conflict and political instability. People living in poverty, in underdeveloped and unstable states, and under poor governance will be hardest hit by climate change, and the effect of the physical consequences of climate change will add to the pressures under which those societies already live. A recent Sida study[25] suggests that there are four key elements of risk linking climate change to socio-economic and political problems in poorer countries – political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity and large-scale migration.

The study estimates that there are 46 countries – home to 2.7 billion people – in which the effects of climate change interacting with economic, social and political problems will create a high risk of violent conflict. In a second group of 56 countries, with a population of 1.2 billion, the interaction of climate change and other factors will create a high risk of political instability, with potential violent conflict a distinct risk in the longer term.

In most of the conflict-threatened group of 46 states and in many of the 56 in the second group, the authors conclude that it is too late to believe the situation can be made safe solely by reducing carbon emissions worldwide and mitigating climate change: what is required now is for states and communities to adapt to handle the challenges. The authors suggest that for adaptation measures to be effective they have to build on peace-building, engaging communities' energies in a social process to work out how to adapt to climate change and how to handle conflicts as they arise, so that they do not become violent.

In 2007, the UN General Assembly held its first debate on the implications of climate change on international security.

In a climate change report that was presented to the EU Council meeting in March 2008[26], the EU's High Representative Javier Solana noted that the security risks posed by climate change "also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests". The report lists a number of factors that contribute to risk: increasing competition over resources (arable land, water, food) and tension over energy supply, economic damage and risk to coastal cities and infrastructure, loss of territory and border disputes, envi-

[24] http://www.diakonia.se/documents/public/ABOUT_DIAKONIA/Dela_Med/DelaMed_3_2007.pdf

[25] Konflikter i klimatförändringarnas spår. Dan Smith och Janani Vivekananda, Sida, begruari 2008. The Sida study is an edited version of "A Climate of Conflict" by the same authors, published by International Alert in November 2007. The reports are available at http://www.Sida.se/Sida/jsp/Sida.jsp?d=118&a=36114 and http://www.international-alert.org/climate_change.php?id=131

[26] Climate change and international security. Joint paper by the Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative, March 3, 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/doc/climate_change_international_security_2008_en.pdf

ronmentally-induced migration, increasing instability of fragile and failed states, and pressure on international governance. The report suggests a list of measures that centre on enhancing the EU's capacity to respond to disasters and conflict, improved international governance and enhanced support for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Faced with sudden shocks and with long-term challenges brought about or compounded by climate change, people will move to more conducive and safer places. Taken world-wide, as the basic living conditions of hundreds of millions of people will be influenced by climate change, this migration is likely to be on a very large scale. The Stern Report estimates the scale of migration to reach 200 million by 2050, while a UN University study indicates that there will be 50 million 'environmentally displaced people' already by 2010, most of whom will be women and children.[27] Taking into account the impacts of climate change on the environment, growing population and more limited availability of productive resources, migration can potentially result in conflicts over resources. The current conflict in Darfur may be one such example.

CSO responses:

- The 2008 Global Week for Justice in November, organised by the Council of Swedish Churches, will focus on climate and conflicts.
- National Council of Churches of Kenya program on conflict prevention in drought affected Northern Kenya, supported by Diakonia.[28]

Impacts of climate change policies

As if the threats posed by climate change were not enough, poor people in developing countries are also facing negative effects of some of the policies and measures that are taken to mitigate climate change.

Biofuels

The increasing demands for biofuels presents multiple challenges to communities in the South.

The main Southern producer, by far, of ethanol is Brazil, where programs for large-scale production of ethanol for fuel has been part of national policy for decades. As a result, the impacts of the industry are largely known. Ethanol is mainly produced in large sugar cane plantations that surround a processing plant for ethanol

[27] *As ranks of 'environmental refugees' swell worldwide, calls grow for better definition, recognition, support*, The UN University's Institute for Environment and Human Security, 7 March 2007 http://www.ehs.unu.edu/index.php/article:130?menu=44

[28] http://www.diakonia.se/documents/public/ABOUT_DIAKONIA/Dela_Med/DelaMed_3_2007.pdf

and sugar. The plantation area has more than doubled since the early 1980's, and sugar cane is now grown on more than 6 million hectares (almost 10 percent of all cropland in the country). But in spite of the continuing expansion if the industry, the total number of persons employed dropped by one third (from 675,000 to 449,000 permanent and temporary workers) between 1992 and 2003.[29]

Although it is claimed that there is plenty of "available" land for further expansion, there is clearly competition for land in several of the main sugar growing areas, and the Brazilian movement of the landless, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), reports that land reform has virtually come to a standstill in those regions.

Working conditions in the plantations are – as is also the case in other plantation sectors – often miserable and sometimes slave-like, and the right for workers to organise is frequently denied. Productivity demands have risen from a daily requirement for each worker to cut some 6 tons of cane/day in the 1980s, to about 12–15 tons/day today.[30] Protective gear – including for workers that handle pesticides – is insufficient, and accidents are common. Much of the work is seasonal, and as the estates are largely isolated and self-contained, the workers have no other income opportunities off-season.

Sugar cane production affects the environment through the intensive use of agrochemicals, the burning of stalks that causes air pollution, and the very large quantities of liquid waste that pollutes streams and water sources. The fact that sugar cane is a very water intensive crop to grow does not present any problem in most areas where it is grown in Brazil, but could be important if the crop is grown in other areas or countries. Plantations do not directly encroach on rain forest areas, but the expansion may contribute to deforestation by displacing other activities like extensive cattle farming. The greatest threat is in fact not to the Amazon, but to the unique Atlantic Forest that is already in a much worse state. Also, much of the land that is designated as being "available" is *cerrado* – the biologically rich Brazilian savannah grasslands.

In Southeast Asia, there is also plenty of experience of the impacts of a large scale plantation industry that is increasingly turning to the production of biofuels. In Indonesia and Malaysia, indigenous and forest dependent people have seen their land taken over and forest resources destroyed by oil palm plantations for food and industry. In the past years, the rate of conversion of rainforests and peatlands have accelerated, in part as a response to new demands for palm oil as fuel by itself or for conversion to biodiesel. The industry is expanding rapidly also in countries like Colombia, Peru

[29] *Sustainability of Brazilian bio-ethanol.* Smeets, Junginger, Faaij, Walter and Dolzan, University of Utrecht, Copernicus Institute, 2006. http://www.bioenergytrade.org/downloads/sustainability-ofbrazilianbioethanol.pdf

[30] *Ibid.*

and Ecuador, as well as in Africa and to Pacific islands.
The production of other feedstocks for biofuels – including soy and the oil-rich fruits of the *jatropha* tree – poses other challenges. In India some states have allocated large tracts of land for jatropha plantations, effectively locking out communities who have previously used the land for meeting their livelihood needs. The expansion of soy for fuel in Argentina is converting a lot of land to monocultures of largely GM crops for a production of, in comparison to other energy crops, very little fuel per unit of land.

The potential social and food security implications of the biofuel boom has been highlighted in a 2007 report to the UN General Assembly by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.[31] The report expressed grave concern that "biofuels will bring hunger in their wake. The sudden, ill-conceived, rush to convert food — such as maize, wheat, sugar and palm oil — into fuels is a recipe for disaster. There are serious risks of creating a battle between food and fuel that will leave the poor and hungry in developing countries at the mercy of rapidly rising prices for food, land and water." The Special Rapporteur concludes that: "Rather than persuading us to use less energy, the false promise of agrofuels suggests that we can help the climate by simply changing fuels."

But in some countries and some contexts, small farmers also see opportunities in biofuels. In 2005, the movements of small farmers and landless workers in the state of Rio Grande do Sul launched Cooperbio, Brazil's first biodiesel cooperative. The cooperative uses castor bean, jatropha, sunflower and other species produced in diversified systems, and involves about 25,000 families. In Mali, a community program has developed jatropha plantations for use in a multifunctional platform that provides not only liquid fuels but also electricity, heat and mechanical power for a variety of local uses. Also in Southern Africa, models have been developed for "pro-poor" biodiesel production based on a variety of perennial oilseed crops.[32]

CSO responses:
Responses vary greatly due to a wide range of differences among CSOs in terms of the local context where they work, as well as their social base, priorities and approaches.

- Many farmers organisations produce feedstocks for biofuels for local consumption (SCC partner cooperative in Tanzania). Some among them also see opportunities in linking up with export markets.

[31] *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.* UN General Assembly document A/62/289. 22 August 2007. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/62/289&Lang=E
[32] Examples from *Fuel for development? The implications of growing demand for biofuel from the South.* Göran Eklöf. Naturskyddsföreningen 2007. http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/upload/Foreningsdokument/Rapporter/rapport_trafik_fuelfordevelopement.pdf

- Several organisations that represent small farmers, landless rural poor, indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities reject and resist the expansion of the biofuels industry, at least to the extent that the industry is targeting international markets. (MST, CPT and Movement Against the Green Desert in Brazil and several members of the World Rainforest Movement are UBV or SSNC partners)
- Swedish CSOs, in partnership with groups in the South, raise the awareness of decision makers and the public about the opportunities and risks associated with the growing demand for biofuels from developing countries. (SCC, SSNC, SwedWatch)[33]
- Industrialised country CSOs, in partnership with groups in the South, lobby the EU and national governments on the need for biofuel consumption targets to incorporate environmental/social sustainability and human rights criteria.
- Some participate in or explore initiatives to develop such criteria. (WWF through Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil, Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels and the Sustainable Soy initiative, SSNC with MAB in Brazil and Walhi in Indonesia)

Hydropower and nuclear energy

Many new hydropower dams and nuclear power plants are now promoted with the argument that they will provide "fossil free" alternatives to the use of fossil fuels. The claim in itself is questionable – the worst hydropower dams in the tropics may actually cause greenhouse gas emissions that are considerably higher than if the same amount of electricity is generated in a coal power plant, and the CO2 emissions of some nuclear power plants – measured over the whole life cycle of the plants, fuel and waste – are close to the emission levels of the best fossil gas power plants.[34] Several new hydropower dam projects have been approved as CDM projects.

"Dams and Development", the report of the World Commission on Dams, (WCD),[35] estimated that in the past 50 years some 40-80 million people have been physically displaced by dams worldwide. Many of the displaced were not resettled or compensated, and where compensation was provided it was often inadequate. Those who were resettled rarely had their livelihoods restored, as resettlement programmes have focused on physical relocation rather than the economic and social development of the displaced. In addition,

[33] *See Fuel for development? The implications of growing demand for biofuel from the South.* Göran Eklöf. Naturskyddsföreningen 2007. http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/upload/Foreningsdokument/Rapporter/rapport_trafik_fuelfordevelopement.pdf
Med utveckling i tanken. Om biodrivmedel i Afrika som en möjlig väg ur fattigdomen. Kooperation utan gränser, 2008. http://www.utangranser.se/Default.aspx?ID=785

[34] *En ulv i fårakläder? Vattenkraft och växthusgaser.* Göran Eklöf. Naturskyddsföreningen 2006. http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/upload/rapport_internationellla_en_ulv_i%20faraklader.pdf
Fredrik Lundström, Naturskyddsföreningen 2008 (forthcoming).

[35] Dams and Development. A New Framework for Decision-Making. World commission on Dams, 2000. http://www.dams.org/

millions of people living downstream from dams have also suffered serious harm to their livelihoods and the future productivity of their resources has been put at risk.

The mining of uranium as fuel for nuclear power plants has resulted in serious land conflicts and pollution that affect local communities in Namibia, Niger, Kazakhstan and other developing countries (local and indigenous communities Australia and Canada, who are the producers of uranium, are subjected to similar effects). Such impacts are likely to increase as higher prices make it profitable to mine lower grade ores.

CSO responses:

- Swedish CSOs (SSNC, WWF, UBV, Africa Groups) have supported a range of NGOs, networks of popular movements and community groups, and indigenous peoples organisations in stopping or modifying harmful hydropower projects, and in claiming their rights to proper resettlement and restored livelihoods when projects are realised. Southern CSO projects for the development of mini- and micro-hydro projects for local power generation have also been supported.
- Swedish and Southern CSOs have jointly campaigned to reform policies of donors, financial institutions, governments and companies to adopt or improve environmental and social safeguard policies or corporate social responsibility guidelines.
- Several Swedish CSOs (SSNC, WWF, MJV-FoE, the River Savers' Association, National Union of the Swedish Sámi People) collaborated around the WCD process. They assisted dam affected communities and groups in the South in providing input to the commission and to participate in both the consultation process and the follow-up. The organisations have actively followed up the work in relation to relevant Swedish and international actors (Sida and the Foreign Ministry, international financial institutions, export credit agencies and the private sector).
- SSNC has highlighted the risk that dams may in fact release more – sometimes significantly more – greenhouse gases than production of the same amounts of electricity from coal or oil. This risk is greatest for dams with shallow reservoirs in tropical forest areas – a category of dams that is also likely to have the greatest negative impacts on the local environment and local communities.[36]
- SSNC is producing a report on nuclear power and climate change (forthcoming)

[36] *En ulv i fårakläder? Vattenkraft och växthusgaser.* Göran Eklöf. Naturskyddsföreningen 2006. http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/upload/rapport_internationellla_en_ulv_i%20faraklader.pdf

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), carbon sinks and carbon trading

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows industrialised countries to implement projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries in order to meet part of their own emissions reductions emissions under the UN Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). One major purpose of the CDM is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development. (For more on the Convention and CDM, see the section on *Climate Change Policy Fora* below)

However, the CDM leaves the issue of assessing the sustainable development impacts of projects to the authorities of the projects' host countries, without any additional guidelines or standards. The largest volume, by far, of emission reductions certificates (CERs) that have been issued are from industrial gas projects (freons etc), where large reductions can be achieved at a very low cost, but without any development impacts of any kind. CERs issued from energy efficiency and renewable energy projects (excluding large hydropower) have so far been insignificant, although their share seems to be growing. Women's rights organisations have shown that technologies and project types that are likely to benefit women, such as transports and energy projects for the domestic sector, make up a very small share of total projects.

In other cases, projects and methodologies have been approved that CSOs claim have direct negative impacts on the environment and/or local communities. Such projects include, among many other, hydropower dams that disrupt river ecosystems, undermines livelihoods and cause displacement of local communities; and forest plantation projects that restrict the access of local communities to land and forest resources. By late May 2008, 861 hydro projects were in the CDM pipeline (representing 26 percent of all projects), out of which 192 had already been registered. Due to the late approval of rules that regulate afforestation and reforestation projects, their number is still very limited: only 18 projects are in the pipeline.[37]

Furthermore, many CDM projects have been criticised for not resulting in any emissions reductions that are additional to what would have been the case without the CDM (or, in a few cases, no emissions reductions at all). As an effect, the fact that CERs from such projects allow emitters in industrialised countries to emit more greenhouse gases leads to a net increase in global greenhouse gas emissions.

As a result of recent and ongoing negotiations, the CDM approach is likely to be expanded to a wide range of projects that aim to absorb and bind carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in trees and other short- and medium term "carbon sinks", and projects that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).

[37] CDM Pipeline Overview, viewed on May 22, 2008. http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMpipeline.xls

One new mechanism for financing such activities is the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) that the World Bank launched in Bali during the last meeting of the UN Convention on Climate Change. The process of developing the FCPF has been marked by a near-total lack of consultation with peoples most likely to be directly affected, including indigenous peoples, and the proposed Facility does not provide for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples.

While many CSOs are critical of the way that CDM and sinks projects have been linked to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), carbon trading in itself is becoming an increasingly contentious issue. Critics point to the inequitable allocation of emissions rights, the risks that the trading system delays structural changes in sectors and industries where the need is the most urgent, and that the dominance of market solutions may hamper the possibility to use other political tools.

CSO responses:

- CSOs that work on a range of issues that include forests, dams, renewable energy and environment monitor both the CDM as an institutional mechanism (policies, assessment frameworks etc) and individual CDM projects. Information on selected projects is disseminated via sites like SinksWatch and Carbon Trade Watch.[38]
- CSOs assist local communities and organisations in assessing proposed projects and to alert national and international bodies, media and the public about abuses.
- Some CSOs, including the WWF, have developed a "Gold Standard" that aims to guarantee the environmental integrity and sustainable development contributions of CDM projects, and promote the use of standard by investors and authorities.
- Environmental CSOs have called on the Swedish government not to include CERs from CDM projects in the statistics on progress with regard to meeting the national emissions reductions goal, and so far, the government has not included them.
- NGOs and indigenous organisations are active in the carbon sinks debate and monitor exiting and emerging mechanisms (SinksWatch, Forest Peoples Programme). Many CSOs reject the inclusion of forests and forest projects in carbon markets. In late 2007, CSOs requested that the whole FCPF proposal be delayed until proper public consultation had taken place and until serious questions on rights, equity and accountability had been answered. Others advise the Bank to keep its "hands off" indig-

[38] www.sinkswatch.org and www.carbontradewatch.org. CDMWatch used to publish more comprehensive information, but the project was discontinued in 2005. The UNEP Risoe Center now maintains useful lists and statistics over CDM projects, but does not scrutinise individual projects. http://cdmpipeline.org/

enous peoples' forests. Critical organisations include the World Rainforest Movement, Asian Indigenous People's Pact and several other SSNC partners, and Friends of the Earth members in the South.

- Several CSOs have also started exploring CDM and other certification schemes as mechanisms for mobilising additional financial resources for development projects. SCC and Vi Agroforestry (Vi-skogen) recently announced that it will be selling certified carbon credits from its agroforestry projects through the World Bank's Biocarbon Fund.[39]
- 'The Durban Group', an international network of organisations that are critical to carbon trading, was formed at a CSO meeting in Durban 2004. [40] The group formulated *"Climate Justice Now! – The Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading"* which has been signed by over 180 organisations. The initiative produced the publication *'Carbon Trading: A critical conversation on climate change, privatisation and power'* which includes critical perspectives on both emissions trading and off-sets. The Durban Group has also been important in the formation of the new coalition 'Climate Justice Now!' that came out of the Bali process in December 2007 (see the section International CSO networks and initiatives below).

Geo-engineering and large-scale techno fixes

As the urgency and concern over climate change escalates, the temptation of opting for large-scale, quick-fix solutions also increases. New technologies, many involving nanotechnology, may seem to offer an escape from difficult political processes grounded in changing consumption patterns, structural transformations and social justice. They may, if they fail, however pose new serious threats to both health and the environment. Recently, a number of new such techno-fix 'solutions' have been presented and explored. 'Geo-engineering' – modification of the earth on a planetary scale to tackle climate change – was highlighted in Time magazine as one of the 10 most significant ideas for 2008. Nobel laurate Paul Crutzen argues that deliberate 'pollution' of the atmosphere with sulphur particles, in order to reflect some of the incoming sunlight, can be an "escape route" in order to prevent runaway climate change. Similarly, ideas of using commercial air transportation to spread tiny metal nano-particles in the atmosphere as a huge 'venetian blind', or to fertilise oceans on a large scale with iron nano-particles to increase absorption of CO2 by plankton have been seriously considered.

Currently, much activity is also taking place within the new field of 'synthetic biology'. This new science essentially aims to redesign and construct new life forms. Many projects explicitly aim to pro-

[39] http://www.sccportal.org/Default.aspx?ID=583&M=News&PID=56&NewsID=1278
[40] http://www.carbontradewatch.org/durban/index.html

vide solutions to climate change, i.e. by designing new bacteria to absorb CO2 or to produce energy. Few within civil society, or society at large, are aware of these developments which may seem to be bordering science-fiction but are taking place very quickly. Just as biotechnology twenty years ago was largely unknown outside of science circles, nanotechnology and geo-engineering are bound to soon become a major focus of debate and present new concerns with regards to social justice, environment and health.

Increasingly, the urgency of the climate crisis is used as a rationale for the development of new large-scale technologies, as well as the resurgence of already established centralised technologies such as nuclear power. Civil society will have a key role in pressing for assessment and differentiation between questionable technologies and those that have a significant potential for sustainability and social justice.

CSO responses:

- There are few civil society organisations explicitly working on and monitoring new technologies from a social justice and equity perspective. One of the most active and leading organisations is the Canada-based ETC Group.[41] As one example, ETC Group discovered in 2007 that the corporation Planktos Inc. was planning to dump 100 tons of iron nano-particles close to the Galapagos islands. The assumed CO2 absorption due to the ocean fertilisation was intended to compensate for CO2 emissions in the North as an example of the growing market of voluntary carbon off-set schemes. Through rapid mobilisation within civil society and ensuing action by the London Convention on ocean dumping, the ship could be stopped.
- A global civil society process with a focus on geo-engineering and new converging technologies at the nano-scale is currently being consolidated, with a global strategy meeting planned for France in November 2008, a range of activities following connection with the World Social Forum 2009, and possibly a global summit on science, technology and democracy the following year. Climate justice oriented organisations are already involved in these processes.

Financing and investments

'The poorest developing countries will be hit earliest and hardest by climate change, even though they have contributed little to causing the problem. Their low incomes make it difficult to finance adaptation. The international community has an obligation to support them in adapting to climate change. Without such support there is a serious risk that development progress will be undermined.' The Stern Review, 2006

[41] Action Group on Erosion, Technological Tranformation and Concentration, www.etcgroup.org

The World Bank has produced a preliminary estimate that it will cost around $10–40bn per year to climate-proof investments in developing countries. The Bank has estimated the proportion of investments sensitive to climate risk in each category of development finance (government spending and domestic private-sector investment, ODA, and foreign direct investment), and then estimated the extra costs of 'climate-proofing' those investments through adaptation.

This World Bank's figure is often cited as 'the cost of adaptation'. However, according to many other organisations, it only accounts for a fraction of the adaptation that is needed. One reason is that the Bank's calculations primarily account for the costs faced by 'macro actors' for integrating adaptation into ongoing planning, policies and practices, and for climate-proofing ongoing infrastructural investments. What it does not account for are:

- the costs for 'macro actors' of climate-proofing the existing stock of natural and physical capital where no new investment had been planned, or the cost of financing new investments needed specifically because of climate change.
- the costs faced by 'community-level actors' (households, communities, and local NGOs) for the vast majority of their adaptation needs.

Based on their own assessments of these missing costs, Oxfam estimates that the cost of adapting to climate change in developing countries is likely to be at least $50bn annually, and will be far more if greenhouse-gas emissions are not cut fast enough.[42] Christian Aid estimates the need for such funds to be in the order of $100bn per year. The UNDP estimates that additional annual investments of $86 billion will be required by 2015 in order to avoid diversion of aid funds to adaptation.

Christian Aid has, together with the Stockholm Environment Institute and others, has developed the concept of "Greenhouse Development Rights", GDR – a framework for equitable sharing of the burden of the costs of climate change.[43] The proposal suggests a 'development threshold' at a per capita income of $ 9,000 per year – just over the global average – under which individuals must be allowed to prioritize development. This means that they should not have to help bear the burdens of dealing with the changing climate, on either the mitigation or the adaptation sides.

For income levels above the threshold, a system is presented for calculating the share of countries' responsibilities based on their capacity and responsibility for cumulative greenhouse gas emissions. As a result of applying the methodology, one-third of the burden of

[42] *Adapting to climate change*, Oxfam Briefing Paper 104, May 2007.

[43] *The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework.* The Heinrich Böll Foundation, Christian Aid, EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, November 2007. http://www.ecoequity.org/docs/TheGDRsFramework.pdf

dealing globally with climate change falls on the shoulders of the US and one-quarter is down to the European Union. The bigger developing nations with a sizable consuming class would be net receivers of mitigation finance but would still have to add some of their own, the poorest nations can focus their efforts on achieving sustainable development goals.

Similarly, Oxfam has developed an *Adaptation Financing Index* that aims to measure the responsibility and capability of countries to contribute towards financing of the costs for the adaptation of poor countries to climate change. According to Oxfam's calculations, the United States and the EU should jointly provide 75 percent of the funds to meet the estimated costs for investments that will be needed. Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea should cover an additional 20 percent.

But the volume of funds is only one dimension of the problem. It will be equally important to ensure that the mechanisms for the delivery of adaptation financing are designed in ways that can ensure that poor and vulnerable groups in particular will have access to the necessary resources. Several CSOs have proposed sets of principles for adaptation funding channels that include parameters such as democratic governance, community and civil society participation, targeting of poor and vulnerable groups (including women, children, indigenous peoples and minorities), and support for an enabling environment that promotes equal rights and access by these groups to information, decision making, resources and services.[44]

Adaptation, aid and new sources of funding

Of specific concern to many development CSOs, as well as to developing country governments, is the risk that the need for massive funding for adaptation to climate change will compete with and crowd out official development assistance (ODA).

The Monterrey conference on Financing for Development recognized that "a substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration" and called for improved targeting of ODA for the poor.[45] But funding for adaptation to climate change does not provide support for these development efforts – it should rather be seen as remedies for harm that developing countries are only marginally responsible for, and financing for measures that aim to not worsening their situation.

The position of most CSOs that have given consideration to the issue has been to reject the use of ODA funds for adaptation programs. This is also, in general, the view that is expressed in the

[44] For one recent example, see *Compensating for Climate Change: Principles and Lessons for Equitable Adaptation Funding*, ActionAid USA, December 2007.
[45] The Monterrey Consensus, paragraphs 41 and 42.

2007 Human Development Report. Some CSOs do however accept that, in the short term, funds for adaptation are provided through debt cancellation and increased development aid.

The Bali meeting in December 2007 marked the launch of a new Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC, but also agreed on the need for "new and additional" sources of funding. The Adaptation Fund will be financed trough voluntary contributions, as well as by a levy on emissions reductions in the CDM, but this levy is only expected to raise less than 1 percent of the annual financing requirement for adaptation. Several proposals have been launched on new and innovative sources of financing. These include levies on air tickets, and incomes from auctioning of emissions permits in a revised EU emissions trading scheme. Germany has already decided to use about one third of incomes from auctioning of a smaller share of emissions permits for international programs, including for adaptation..

The position of the Swedish government on this issue is far from clear. Some comments that have been made by government officials in response to questions from CSOs have given them cause for concern, as they seem to indicate that a) as ODA is not very efficient, some of it could better be used for adaptation, or b) it will not be possible to raise any significant amounts of new funding from other sources.[46]

World Bank, fossil fuels and new climate funds

In the past several years, the World Bank has initiated or participated in a number of new funds and other mechanisms that aim to address different investment needs that are related to climate change. In 1999, it set up the Prototype Carbon Fund, PCF, to which the government of Sweden has contributed directly. The PCF was soon to be followed by two more mechanisms for financing of CDM projects – the Community Development Carbon Fund and the BioCarbon Fund (which specifically targets carbon sink projects).

In the last two years the World Bank has also presented the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF – see under "CDM and Carbon Sinks" above) and the Climate Investment Fund. The Climate Investment Fund alone aims to mobilise a USD 7–12 billion in a portfolio for climate investments.

Both initiatives have been heavily criticised by CSOs. With regard to Climate Investment Fund, some 20 international NGOs warned, in March 2008, that the current rush to finalise the proposal for the fund could lead to the establishment of "top-down funds, without adequate participation of developing countries, without much needed accountability mechanisms, and without promoting the wider environmental and development benefits and sustain-

[46] Joakim Stymne, State Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at a seminar organised in the Swedish Parliament by the Swedish Christian Council and GLOBE, November 21, 2007.

able transformations". (For CSO's critique of the FCPF, see under "CDM and Carbon Sinks" above).

But the critics also question why the World Bank – with its own dismal record of massive funding for funding fossil fuels projects, but very little to show when it comes to renewables – should be entrusted with managing very large funds for combating climate change? For the past 15 years, the ratio between the Bank's investments in fossil fuels and renewables has been about 17 to 1.[47] Shouldn't the Bank, first and foremost, use the funds that are already at its disposal for investments in renewable energy solutions?

Similar critique has been addressed to other international financial institutions, as well as to the export credit agencies of most industrialised countries. It is only recently that OECD rules have allowed the terms for export credits and guarantees to renewable energy projects to be improved to the same favourable levels as for fossil fuels projects, but the terms for fossil fuels have not yet been revised downwards.[48]

At the April meetings of two Climate Change Convention working groups, CSOs and developing countries wanted the funds for adaptation and investments to be managed through mechanisms under the Convention itself.[49]

Making trade work for the climate

A number of issues that regulated by or being negotiated in the World Trade Organisation, WTO, have implications on greenhouse gas emissions. WTO rules may affect emissions either directly, through the ways in which they change global trade flows, or indirectly by restricting the political space for implementing climate policy measures. These relate to, among other issues:

Trade in environmental goods

The issue of reducing barriers to trade in "environmental" goods and services are part of the Doha Mandate for negotiations. Work

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[47] In 2004, the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network, SEEN, reported that since Rio Summit in 1992, the World Bank had approved one new fossil fuel project every 14 days. In volume, fossil fuel projects outflanked renewable energy investments in the Bank's lending portfolio by 17 to 1. Over 80% of all oil projects financed by the World Bank since 1992 were for export back to the wealthy Northern countries. These projects accounted for over half of the carbon dioxide emissions associated with Bank energy programs.
A Wrong Turn from Rio – The World Bank's Road to Climate Catastrophe. Jim Vallette, Daphne Wysham and Nadia Martínez, 2004. http://www.seen.org/PDFs/Wrong_turn_Rio.pdf
Two years later, SEEN and eight other CSOs noted that the World Bank continued to "invest $2 to $3 billion a year in greenhouse gas-producing energy projects, which fuel climate change and fail to help the world's poor. Financing for renewable energy projects makes up less than 5 percent of the Bank's overall energy financing in fiscal year 2005." *How the World Bank's Energy Framework Sells the Climate and Poor People Short. A Civil Society Response to the World Bank's Investment Framework for Clean Energy and Development.* Published by SEEN and eight other CSOs in October 2006. http://www.seen.org/PDFs/Energy_Framework_CSO.pdf
For a recent Swedish CSO initiative on this issue, see http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/upload/Foreningsdokument/Rapporter/engelska/Report_Assessement_World_Bank.pdf

[48] *No development guaranteed. Nordic Export Credit Agencies and Development Policy*. Göran Eklöf. Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, 2006.

[49] *World Bank accused of climate change "hijack"*. Reuters, April 4, 2008.

has so far mainly been centred on the Committee on Trade and Environment, CTE, but if progress is made it will gradually shift to the negotiating platforms on industrial goods and services.

Targeted tariff reductions could potentially help the diffusion of climate friendly technologies. There are however problems regarding the possible "dual uses" of any given technology, either for beneficial or for environmentally harmful purposes. There is also concern that such tariff reductions would unilaterally benefit industrialised country exports. Developing county proposals to include less technical categories of goods have so far not met with much enthusiasm, and they are also associated with complications. For example, increased trade in biofuels may bring climate benefits, but also negative environmental impacts. The issue is further complicated by the resistance from developing countries to differentiating between similar goods on the basis of how they have been produced, although a recent proposal from Brazil to include products from organic agriculture in the definition of environmental goods may signal an opening.

Intellectual property rights on climate friendly technologies

Closely related to the issue above is the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR, such as patents and copyright) on climate friendly technologies. There is a commitment in the Climate Change Convention to cooperate in the development and diffusion of technologies that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and developed country Parties have committed to take "all practicable steps" to facilitate access to such technologies. There is, however, no mechanisms in place to ensure that patents and other forms of IPRs do not create price barriers that restrict the access by developing countries, and the issue is not being addressed in the ongoing WTO negotiations. In the UNFCCC, the issue is only just beginning to emerge. At a recent meeting in Bangkok, a proposal was floated to the effect that countries should be allowed to issue compulsory licenses for climate change technologies – meaning they would be able to unilaterally make decisions to allow domestic companies to copy proprietary technologies without following normal procedures for patented goods.

Carbon taxes and border tax adjustment

There is widespread agreement that carbon taxes are the most cost-effective way of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. They are, however, applied very differently between countries. There is concern that producers of energy-intensive goods in countries with high taxes will be put at a disadvantage in competition with producers in countries with low or no carbon taxes, and that energy-intensive production will gradually shift to such countries as a result.

One way of addressing the problem, at least on the home markets, would be to impose a tax on the imbedded carbon emissions of

imported goods. There is, however, serious concern that such measures could restrict the already difficult access of developing countries to industrialised country markets. It is also questionable if a border tax on carbon is in violation of WTO rules on non-discrimination. An alternative approach seems to be emerging in the United States, where it is proposed that importers of goods would be required to purchase emission allowances to offset greenhouse gas emissions that are embedded in imported goods from applicable countries. This approach is less likely to be challenged in the WTO.

Subsidies

State subsidies to energy production and consumption amounts to hundreds of billion USD annually.[50] Rich- country subsidies to their domestic fossil-fuel industries stood at $73 billion per year in the late 1990s.[51]

Subsidies come in a number of forms: as direct payments that support production, tax exemptions and other tax-related subsidies, policies that reduce the cost of inputs, investment subsidies, and policies that regulate domestic market prices.[52] The latter form of subsidies is more common in developing countries – for example in Iran, a litre of petrol costs less than 15 US cents.

Subsidies are also increasingly used for energy-efficient methods of production and renewable energy sources. If such subsidies are found to be specific – whether by intent or de facto – to certain enterprises, industries or groups, they would be considered actionable under WTO rules.

CSO approaches:

- International partners of several Swedish CSOs – including Third World Network and Focus on the Global South – are prominent participants in the general international trade debate that centres around the Doha Round of trade negotiations.
- Several Southern groups that work on agriculture and biodiversity have also been engaged in the TRIPS processes on intellectual property rights and biological resources.
- Among the Swedish CSOs, Church of Sweden, Diakonia, Forum Syd, SSNC and WWF have been active participants in the trade policy debates. SSNC is conducting a research project with Southern partners on trade and climate change.

[50] In its 2004 report, *The Price of Power,* the New Economics Foundateion "conservatively" estimated global subsidies to fossil fuels to amount to some $235 bn. http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/news_pop.aspx

[51] *Up in Smoke, Threats from, and responses to, the impact of global warming on human development.* The Working Group on Climate Change and Development.

[52] *The WTO and Energy.* Yulia Selivnova. ICTSD Programme on Trade and Environment, Issues Paer No. 1, August 2007.

2.3 The Challenge: Linking Sustainable Livelihoods to Climate Concerns

Taking the previous section as a point of departure, a couple of key approaches can be seen by which CSOs engage in climate related work:

Defending the right to land and resources

CSOs support communities in their efforts to have access to, control and sustainably manage their land, forests and other natural resources. The support builds both on a commitment to defending and asserting the basic rights of communities, and on a recognition of the fact that when these rights are respected small farmers, indigenous people and forest dependent communities can be strong defenders of forests, watersheds and biodiversity.

Building resilience and facilitating adaptation

A broad range of CSOs are working on projects that contribute to increasing the adaptive capacity of communities to climate change, through projects on sustainable agriculture, water management, and biodiversity conservation. Most of these projects may not have been started with the aim of addressing climate changes, but to meet more immediate needs of the communities. However, by addressing issues of water scarcity, conservation of agricultural biodiversity, and promotion of low-input, organic and integrated agricultural systems, the resilience of the communities to climate change will increase, as will their livelihood options.

Addressing energy poverty

Worldwide, almost 2 billion people still mainly depend on traditional fuels like fuelwood, charcoal and dried cow dung for most of their energy needs. Giving them access to modern renewable energy can radically improve their lives, health and livelihood opportunities. Although not many of the larger Swedish CSOs seem to be engaged in this line of work, many CSOs in the South are implementing projects that aim to increase the access by poor people to more efficient, cleaner and better energy. [53]

Advocacy and campaigning

Northern and Southern CSOs engage together in a broad range of initiatives that aim at bringing the voices of the poor into the public debate and promoting their participation in decision-makers at all levels. They engage in influencing national and international policy making and decisions by governments, international institutions,

[53] One network that addresses and coordinates CSO work on renewable energy for development is the CURES *(Citizens United for Renewable Energy and Sustainability)* network. It was formed in response to the failure of the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 to meaningfully address energy issues, and has been following up on the issue in various fora. www.cures-network.org

aid agencies, corporate leaders and Northern consumers so that their actions take into account the interests and views of the poor and vulnerable. Specifically related to climate change, they organise to strengthen their voices in negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the World Trade Organisation, and a number of other international fora.

Joint CSO analysis and programming

Several of the larger international CSOs have initiated processes by which they can work together with partners to both identify and address the climate challenges that they face. There is a need to first analyse how climate change is likely to affect the communities and beneficiaries with which they work, and possibly change the premises on which their development strategies are based. In a second stage, the Southern CSO partners will need to develop – with assistance, if needed – strategies for dealing with the issues that have been identified on the basis of their own specific conditions, capacities and roles. A few Swedish CSOs are planning for, or in the initial stages of engaging in, similar consultative processes.

Climate compensation

Some development CSOs have launched or are considering their own ”climate offset” programs through which individuals, institutions and companies are offered to compensate for their greenhouse gas emissions by supporting the CSO’s climate related projects (Viskogen, Norwegian Church Aid). Other CSOs reject the concept of ”offsets”. The Church of Sweden is attempting to develop an alternative model that aims to replace the notion of “neutralising” the own emissions with the idea of paying compensation to the people who are negatively affected by climate change.

3. Climate Change Policy Fora

For CSOs that want to engage with and influence international decision-makers and policies, there is a wide array of institutions and policies that can be addressed. A few of the key fora, from the perspective of Swedish CSOs that work on international development, are presented below. Depending on the character of the issues that any individual CSO may be working on, there may also be other fora and processes where they can make their voices heard.

3.1 The Climate Change Convention, UNFCCC

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)[54] was adopted at the World Summit on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and entered into force on March 21, 1994. As of August 2007, it had been ratified by 192 countries (including, it may be worth noting, by the United States).

The convention provides, as the name indicates, the framework for international cooperation to address the challenge of climate change. The convention itself sets an ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system", but does not say much on how that target is to be achieved. By ratifying the convention, however, parties agree to develop national programmes to slow climate change.

The Convention places the heaviest burden for fighting climate change on industrialized nations, since they are the source of most past and current greenhouse gas emissions. As an expression of the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility" these "Annex I" countries[55] were asked to do the most to cut emissions, and to provide most of the money for efforts elsewhere. Industrialized nations listed in Annex II committed to support climate change activi-

[54] http://unfccc.int

[55] Annex 1 to the convention lists the industrialised countries including economies in transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Annex II lists 23 OECD member countries plus the European Union

ties in developing countries by providing financial support above and beyond any financial assistance they already provide to these countries. They also agreed to assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects. The Global Environment Facility was appointed to be the official funding mechanism for implementation of the convention.

More specific commitments for emissions reductions were introduced through the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted at the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP)[56] to the Convention in 1997. But the Kyoto Protocol did not enter into force before February 16, 2005, when it had been ratified by a sufficient number of countries representing at least 55 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. Through the protocol, Annex I countries agreed to individual emissions reduction commitments for the first commitment period 2008–2012, which added up to a minimum reduction of 5 percent compared to the base year of 1990.[57]

The Kyoto Protocol also defined the framework for the three "flexible mechanisms" for financing and transfer of emissions reductions: emissions trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The two latter are often referred to as "project based mechanisms" as they provide investments in individual projects in Annex I countries (JI) and countries without reduction commitments (CDM).

Considering the last year's debates, and in particular the reporting from the 13th COP in Bali (in December 2007), it may be worth noting that the Kyoto Protocol does not "expire" in 2012. The Kyoto Protocol foresees the negotiation and agreement, within the framework of the Protocol, on new commitments for subsequent commitment periods and instructs the COP to "initiate the consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period" (a working group was set up in 2005 with a mandate to start such negotiations). The Kyoto Protocol does not imply any requirement to extend reduction commitments to non-Annex 1 parties.

COP13 agreed on a process for negotiations of a post-2012 agreement, but without any clear definition of its scope or format. A roadmap has been drawn up, which aims for an agreement to be reached at COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009. The road goes via COP14 in Poznan, Poland, on December 1–12, 2008, as well as a series of technical and working groups meetings. A first

[56] The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the decision-making body for the convention. For issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol, which has a more restricted membership, the equivalent body is called "the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol" or COP-MOP.

[57] The commitments cover carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases, with the emissions of each gas converted into "carbon dioxide equivalents" based on their relative greenhouse effect.

sets of such meetings[58] were held in Bangkok in April and in Bonn in June 2008. [59] The working groups that met in Bangkok will meet again in Accra, Ghana, on August 21–27.

3.2 The World Trade Organisation

Most of the current negotiations in the World Trade Organisation, WTO, are taking place within the framework of the Doha Round of negotiations that was launched in 2001. The Doha Round aims to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of trade liberalisation. Negotiations are coordinated by the Trade Negotiations Committee under the chairmanship of the WTO Director-General, but negotiations take place in a number of Negotiating Groups. Two such groups have been set up specifically for the purpose: the groups on Market Access and on WTO Rules (which covers anti-dumping, subsidies and regional trade agreements). The other Negotiating Groups are existing WTO bodies like the Agriculture Committee, the Services Council, and the Trade and Environment Committee. Issues of importance for the access to and transfer of climate friendly technologies are, however, discussed in the TRIPS Council without any direct links to the Doha agenda.

A series of deadlines for the conclusion of negotiations have been passed without any agreement on core issues, and the timetable for the Doha negotiations has been revised on several occasions. The last Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 set out a timeline for negotiations in 2006, and after that negotiations have proceeded through consecutive postponements. After the failure to reach an agreement at the WTO talks in Geneva in the end of July 2008 negotiations seem to have been, at least temporarily, put on hold.

3.3 The European Union

Climate change, and also trade, are areas where the European Commission negotiates on behalf of all EU member states, and it is thus important for CSOs in the EU to not only address their national governments but also to follow and try to influence key EU processes.

Many EU decisions are also directly applicable to Sweden and other member states. This includes decisions on burden-sharing in the implementation of EU commitments under Kyoto and future climate agreements, the European emissions trading scheme (ETS), EU targets for renewable energy, etc. Furthermore, EU policies and programs in key areas like transports will have major implications for the ability of Sweden to shift to less carbon-intensive strategies.

[58] Meetings of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad hoc Working Group on further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).

[59] Sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and of the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG KP).

In January 2008, the European Commission presented a proposal for a climate and energy package. The package concretises the goal that were set in by the European Council in 2007: to reduce EU emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 20 percent by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels). This target will be increased to 30 percent by 2020 if a new global climate change agreement is reached.

The EU also aims to increase the share of renewable energies in its energy consumption to 20 percent. A target for the share of biofuels for transportation in 2020 is set at 10 percent. A goal for energy efficiency aims for a 20 percent increase by 2020.

The Commission proposes to expand the coverage of the emissions trading scheme by including more sectors, and to auction a part of the emission allowances rather assigning them to emitters free of charge. Emissions from sources that are included in the emissions trading scheme are to be reduced by 21 percent by 2020, compared to levels in 2005. The Commission estimates that the revenues from the auctioning could amount to €50 billion annually by 2020, and suggests that they should be used to help the EU to adjust by supporting innovation in areas such as renewables, carbon capture and storage and R&D. Part of the revenues should also go towards helping developing countries adapt to climate change and protect forests.

In the next step, the Commission's proposals will be reviewed by the European Parliament. The commission aims to have a decision on the package before COP15 of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in December 2009. As Sweden will be the EU Chair during the second half of 2009, the Swedish government will have a key role in getting the package adopted and to coordinate the internal EU processes with the negotiations for and at the COP.

3.4 The Commission on Climate Change and Development

The Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCD) was set up at the initiative of the Swedish Government. The first meeting of the Commission was held on 14–15 February 2008 in Stockholm. The second meeting took place in Cambodia in May, and a third meeting is planned for Mali in October. A final report of the Commission will be delivered in the spring of 2009.

The CCD is composed of 13 renowned individuals from international organisations, academia and civil society, and chaired by the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation. The Commission's secretariat is headed by Johan Schaar from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The main tasks of the Commission, as set out in the Terms of Reference, are to present concrete proposals on:

- how to integrate adaptation, risk reduction and climate-proof development effectively into development and poverty reduction plans in developing countries. The proposals are to take account of a bottom-up perspective and consider local and traditional knowledge in order to ensure effective adaptation and are to be socially efficient and cost-effective.
- how to design Official Development Assistance that takes account of climate impacts and disaster risks in developing countries.

At its May meeting, the Commission reached agreement on a number of preliminary core messages, including on the need for larger resources for adaptation and greater clarity on the nature and objectives of adaptation; on the need to make financial mechanisms more flexible and enabling, and to align support with national policies and institutions; and on the viability of investing in insurance systems.[60]

The Commission has been open to dialog with and contributions from CSOs. Two representatives of the Commission will participate and present its work at the conference on Civil Society on *Climate Change & Justice* in Härnösand in August. The full Commission also met with CSO representatives in connection with its second meeting, in Cambodia, and contacts have been initiated in order for the commission to also meet CSOs in connection with its meeting in Mali.

3.5 Other Fora

Climate change and issues that are relevant to the problem are also discussed and/or negotiated in a number of other fora. Some of these are however of less significance for Swedish CSOs, for example because they have no direct links to the a forum like the G8. Certain CSOs may still find that they may want to engage with some of these initiatives:

- COP 9 of the UN Convention on Biodiversity, held in Bonn in May 2008, had a strong focus on forests issues and links to the negotiations in the Climate Change Convention. A new Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change will have its first meeting in London on November 17–21.
- The ”Monterrey +5” meeting on financing for development. Doha, December 2008
- The UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) session in May 2008 focused on themes that included agriculture, drought, land, and Africa. These same themes will be followed up at the next session, in New York on 4–15 May 2009.

[60] *Progress Report October 2007–June 2008.* Secretariat to the Commission on Climate Change and Development. http://www.ccdcommission.org/Filer/pdf/progress_report_ccdc_june27.pdf

4. International CSO Networks and Initiatives

4.1 Climate Action Network

The Climate Action Network (CAN)[61] is a worldwide network of over 365 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – among them over 100 members in 25 European countries – working to promote government, private sector and individual action to limit human-induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels. The goal is to facilitate action that will prevent harmful climate change and keep global warming as far below 2°C as possible. CAN members work to achieve their goals through the coordination of information exchange and NGO strategy on international, regional and national climate issues.

The network promotes a parallel three track approach to mitigating climate change:

- a Kyoto track,
- a 'Greening' (decarbonisation) track, and
- an Adaptation track.[62]

European CAN members are largely environmental CSOs, but the network also organises a few development organisations like ActionAid, Tearfund, World Council of Churches and the World Development Movement. The two Swedish members are the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Naturskyddsföreningen) and the Swedish NGO Secretariat on Acid Rain (Internationella försurningssekretariatet).

The picture looks quite different in some developing countries. CAN-South Asia membership, for example, includes major development CSOs like BRAC and Proshika in Bangladesh and national chapters or offices of international development CSOs like Caritas,

[61] www.climatenetwork.org (CAN International) and www.climnet.org (CAN Europe)
[62] For details, see http://www.climatenetwork.org/about-can/index_html/three-track-approach

Christan Aid and Oxfam. In other developing counties, however, CAN membership is largely restricted to a few committed individuals. CAN operates regional offices in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

CAN plays an active role in coordinating CSO activities at UNFCCC negotiations and related meetings. Given the composition and history of the network, CAN is sometimes seen by groups in the development sphere as applying a rather technical and "expert" approach. At the same time, CAN and its members obviously possess a great pool of experience and knowledge that can be of great value to organisations who are just beginning to understand the impacts of climate change and the challenges it presents.

4.2 Climate Justice Now!

Climate Justice Now! is a coalition that was initiated in connection with the Bali Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Climate Change Convention in December 2007. The initiative brought together about a dozen international organisations and networks[63], including key actors such as the Durban Group on Climate Justice, Friends of the Earth International, Focus on the Global South and Third World Network.

Although Climate Justice Now! was launched in Bali in December 2007, the network builds on several earlier initiatives:

- In June 2002, at the final preparatory meeting (also in Bali) for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, a coalition of CSOs developed the "Bali Principles for Climate Justice".[64]
- This first Bali initiative was taken forward to the Eighth Conference of the Parties in New Delhi in October 2002, where organisations and movements organised a Climate Justice Summit.[65]

[63] At the time of the launch in Bali in December 2007, coalition included: Carbon Trade Watch, Transnational Institute; Center for Environmental Concerns; Focus on the Global South; Freedom from Debt Coalition, Philippines; Friends of the Earth International; Gendercc – Women for Climate Justice, Global Forest Coalition; Global Justice Ecology Project; International Forum on Globalization; Kalikasan-Peoples Network for the Environment (Kalikasan-PNE); La Via Campesina; Members of the Durban Group for Climate Justice; Oilwatch; Pacific Indigenous Peoples Environment Coalition, Aotearoa/New Zealand; Sustainable Energy and Economy Network; The Indigenous Environmental Network; Third World Network; WALHI/ Friends of the Earth Indonesia; World Development Movement, and World Rainforest Movement.

[64] At the time of the 2002 Bali conference, the International Climate Justice Network included: CorpWatch, Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International, groundwork, Indigenous Environmental Network, Indigenous Information Network, National Alliance of People's Movements, National Fishworkers Forum, OilWatch Africa, OilWatch International, Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, Third World Network and World Rainforest MovementThe declaration can be downloaded from http://www.ejnet.org/ej/bali.pdf

[65] Participants adopted the Delhi Climate Justice Declaration, available at http://www.indiaresource.org/issues/energycc/2003/delhicjdeclare.html For an article on the summit, see http://www.indiaresource.org/issues/energycc/2003/humanfacehumanproblem.html

- In October 2004, representatives of 20 organisations and people's movements came together in Durban, South Africa on October 4–7, 2004 to discuss avenues for addressing climate change. They formed the "Durban Group" and adopted the "Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading", to which an additional 163 organisations and 150 individuals have later signed on.[66]

The Durban Declaration rejects the claim that carbon trading will halt the climate crisis, and warns that it will magnify social inequalities through the commodification and privatisation of land, forests and the global commons. It also points to internal contradictions and uncertainties in the system which risks creating an impression that progress is being achieved when in fact things may even be getting worse. The declaration suggests that halting the continued investments by international financial institutions in coal and oil extraction and processing will be a better way to address the underlying problems of growing emissions from the burning of fossil fuels.

The Climate Justice Now! coalition also characterises carbon trading – as well as offsets and agrofuels – as "false solutions" and points to the need for reduced consumption and extraction of fossil fuels, rights based conservation measures, sustainable farming and large financial transfers to the South for adaptation.

The network is planning an official launch of the "Climate Justice Now! Principles" any time now. Third World Network organised a national consultation with CSOs in Cambodia, coinciding with the May meeting of the Commission on Climate Change and Development, and Focus on the Global South will be hosting a meeting in July with the aim of advancing the climate justice agenda, especially in Asia and amongst the social movements. The coalition does not yet have any specific plans or strategies for Poznan and Copenhagen.

4.3 People's Protocol

The People's Protocol on Climate Change is a 2-year global campaign that aims to create space for marginalized people, especially from the South, to participate in the process of drawing up a post-2012 climate change framework.

Through comprehensive education, information and advocacy work, it seeks to develop the capacity of Southern people's movements and civil society organizations from the North to understand the core issues and debates on climate change. This will facilitate their effective engagement with governments and negotiators, as well as with other multilateral stakeholders.

The initiative took off from a climate change workshop during the Asia Pacific Research Network's annual conference "People and

[66] The declaration (in 5 languages) and a call for action is available at http://www.sinkswatch.org/acttext.html

Planet over Profits: on People's Sovereignty over Natural Resources" in Bangkok in October 2007, where a draft was unanimously approved by over 170 participants from more than 50 organizations in the Asia Pacific region. Many Indonesian and international grassroots organisations also debated and rallied around the call in connection with the COP in Bali in December 2007, and the draft Protocol was revised after the consultations.

The draft Protocol[67] notes that although concerted efforts have been made for combating global warming, the measures set out in the Kyoto Protocol are insufficient and ineffective. While the offsets and emissions trading system transfers adjustment costs from rich to poor, creates new dependencies, rewards corporations for polluting and increases their opportunities for profits. The gravity, scope and depth of the problem demand the greatest collective effort and cooperation, but the Kyoto agreement does not truly involve grassroots communities and peoples who are worst-affected. On the contrary, it has grossly neglected the severe damage to their livelihoods, well-being and welfare". The draft goes on to outline a different approach to addressing the climate challenge, based on principles that include social justice, sovereignty and participation.

The initiative is planning to organise activities around COP14 in Poznan, and is considering plans for a "People's Assembly on Climate Change" to be held in Copenhagen in parallel with COP15 on December 2009.

A global working committee for the People's Protocol is being set up, with the participation of organizations from Asia, Australia and Europe, and efforts are under way for getting more partner organizations in Latin America, North America and Europe to join the initiative. The IBON Foundation in the Philippines is currently coordinating for the initiative. A list serve and a web site for the initiative have been set up,[68] and a comprehensive primer on climate change and the people's protocol campaign is being prepared.

4.4 Polish Groups

A number of Polish groups that are part of the Polish Climate Coalition (including the Polish Ecological Club/Friends of the Earth, WWF and Greenpeace) have started preparing for COP14 in Poznan in December 2008. As there are not a lot of people in Polish CSOs who work on climate issues, it is likely that those who do will be under great pressure from many international stakeholders who want to be active in Poznan.

The Coalition has recently obtained funding for a joint project called "S.O.S Climate!", and the Mazovian Branch of the Polish Ecological Club (PKE/FOE-Poland) will host the campaign secretariat.

[67] Full text is available at http://www.petitiononline.com/ppcc/petition.html
[68] www.peoplesclimateprotocol.aprnet.org

The campaign will engage in awareness-raising activities with the aim of putting climate change higher up on the national political agenda, push for Polish commitment to ambitious climate targets, and make preparations more specifically for the COP14 event. In order to meet these challenges, the Polish Climate Coalition itself will also need to be strengthened.

The main activities of the campaign include:

- coordination of the Climate Coalition preparations for COP14
- establishing an NGO Information Office in Poznan to support Polish and international non-governmental organizations before and during the COP
- capacity building through Climate Coalition strategy meetings and workshops for NGOs; an "Ask your MPs" campaign where NGO representatives encourage citizens to meet with politicians and ask them questions about climate protection; a Climate Friends conference in the Parliament, organized to present climate protection as an issue of the highest political significance and to activate parliamentarians and journalists in this respect; a Climate Tour that will take the best specialists on climate protection in Poland to meetings with interested communities and organizations; and workshops and awards for best articles and TV/radio programmes for journalists
- building cooperation with Parliament, the Ministry of Environment, and other institutions to comment on documents related to climate protection, and to lobby for more ambitious and effective solutions
- a report about Polish climate related policies, predicted impacts of climate change in Poland, possible and necessary actions aiming for reduction of emissions from Polish territory, and for adapting to climate change
- a website, both in Polish and English, with information on climate negotiations, climate protection activities (including analyses conducted by Polish and foreign NGOs), Climate Coalition activities, as well as practical information for NGOs planning to participate in COP in Poznan
- national media campaign on the topic of climate protection, UNFCCC conference, and the role of NGO movement, aiming to increase interest in the subject of global climate change in Polish media and in society
- mass mobilizations before and during the COP, and
- small grants for Climate Coalition members.

4.5 Danish 92 Group

The Danish "92 Group" – Forum for Sustainable Development (92-gruppen) is a coalition of 21 Danish NGO's working on issues related to environment and development. The Danish 92 Group was established in 1991 with the mandate of co-ordinating the Danish NGOs' preparations of United Nation's Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992. The co-operation has continued since then. The group is now working on the follow-up of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) that took place in Johannesburg August/September 2002, and are following different international policy processes including the negotiations in connection with the Climate Convention, the Biodiversity Convention and the WTO.[69]

The 92 Group has developed a project to coordinate Danish and international CSO efforts in the process up to COP 15 of the UFCCCC in December 2009, which is expected to take decisions on international climate policy commitments and mechanisms post-2012.

The 92 Group has received a grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the project, and is setting up a secretariat with two full-time staff to coordinate the work.[70] The project will work on three interlinked strategies, aiming at;

1. Strengthening the participation, cooperation and joint strategy development amongst national and international environment, climate and development organisations in the COP 15 process, hereby strengthening the insight and input into the COP 15 negotiations.
2. Strengthening the level of information and coordination amongst civil society organisations in Denmark, and the broader public participation in the COP 15 process.
3. Strengthening the participation and capacity of selected organisations and networks from developing countries, enabling them to provide a stronger voice from the South in the international climate negotiations.

[69] www.92grp.dk

[70] Until the secretariat has been staffed, the contact person for the project is the 92 Group coordinator Troels Dam Christensen, email tdk@92grp.dk

5. National CSO Networks and Initiatives in Sweden

Unlike our neighbour Denmark – and also Norway – Sweden does not have any permanent structure for collaboration between CSOs on sustainable development issues. The CSO platform that was set up in the process that led up to the Rio Summit in 1992 was dismantled soon after the event, and the same happened to the Alert 2002 platform that coordinate Swedish CSO work for the World Summit in Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002.

Specifically on climate change, there have been some initiatives for collaboration between environmental, humanitarian and development CSOs. For a couple of years around 2000, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, the Red Cross, the United Nations Association, the Church of Sweden and the National Federation of Study Associations cooperated in the campaign "Klimat.nu". The campaign worked with education and advocacy, with a strong focus on encouraging individuals, companies and municipalities to reduce their CO2 emissions. SSNC and the Red Cross have recently launched a new collaboration.

The Swedish Forum for Human Rights (MR-dagarna) is an annual event that is jointly organised by ten Swedish organisations. The next Forum, November 13-14 in Luleå, has "Indigenous Peoples and Minorities" and "Climate Change and Human Rights" as its main themes, and the Forum in 2009 – to be held two weeks before COP15 – will again focus on Climate Change and Human Rights. Both events will provide opportunities for national and international CSOs to coordinate their efforts and views.

In the planning process for the Sida Civil Society Centre conference on *Civil Society on Climate Change and Justice* in August 2008, several CSOs have spoken of the need to build links between development and environment CSOs in order to exchange knowledge and experiences, and to better be able to engage in the climate change debates at the national level. The conference will provide a space for interested CSOs to discuss the forms for their continued dialogue and cooperation.

Halving poverty by 2015 is one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring cooperation and sustainability. The partner countries are responsible for their own development. Sida provides resources and develops knowledge and expertise, making the world a richer place.

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